Probability, Providence, Freedom, Justice, Mercy, and Fate
How does chance/probability align with Providence?
If chance is defined as something that has no cause and is thus
purely random, then chance does not exist.[1] If chance is defined as an
unexpected outcome, then it is another name given to providence from an empiricist’s
perspective.[2] Since God is not only all-knowing, but also all-powerful,
all-loving, absolutely transcendent, and permissive of free-will, He is capable
of using all things expectedly or otherwise, for the good of especially those
who love Him (cf. Romans 8:28 RSVCE).
What moral problem does Boethius claim will arise from
the doctrine of God's foreknowledge?
He firstly posits the question of whether man can be truly free if God can influence chance. He, thereby, foreshadowed both the question of evil and the doctrine of predestination. In the former, we are to answer how God can be all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful, and still, allow for evil to exist. Paradoxically, however, it is because He is loving that He permits evil. Since love must be a free action to be true, then there must be an alternative. Since there must be an alternative and He is loving (and as a consequence not disposed to destroy evil-doers before they commit evil), then evil must exist. For the latter question, since we are loved by God, then we must be free to choose Him or not to choose Him. Therefore, God would not predestine man against man’s will.
Another question may be posed: “Can God be both just and loving, since love does not wish harm and justice sometimes requires it?”
Paradoxically, God allows man to be free because of love. Since man is free to do as he wills, then he is free to choose evil (that which lacks love). When man chooses evil, he then also chooses its consequences. Since justice is rending another their due and God is just, then He rends man the due he chooses. Since man chooses evil and thus its dues, man also chooses its effects on himself, its effects on his neighbor, and the eternal place of rest which is his due. Therefore, God is just and loving, and allows man to ultimately choose his own reward/punishment. However, a disclaimer would be that for us mercy and justice are at odds with each other but neither just nor mercy truly define God.
What is fate? Is it opposed to the idea of Divine Providence?
In regards to fate and providence, it is difficult to define terms in such a way that makes the discussion of whether fate is simply a consequence of providence, or providence a compensation for fate, or some other relationship meaningful. In general, the approach to God via philosophy lacks penetration, because it treats God as something to be discovered and less someone to be encountered, much less loved, and “known”. Thus, defining fate, which is a subset of providence (something the Divine ordained according to Boethius), is nearly without gain. Truly, if we are in a relationship with God, there is only His Ordaining Will and that which evil, the world, or ourself proposes and God permits. God through His transcendence, can bring about good (better) independent of circumstances, and thus, may be argued to be the definition of fate. If this is what we define as fate, then it falls short of providence in the measure that providence can be applied to something more specific like a precise outcome, e.g. surprise birthday meal after a long day of work. In such a case the event could hardly be called fate but is truly providential. Thus, fate can be said to be providence but providence cannot be said to be fate. Therefore, the relationship with God takes the all-encompassing precedent over all circumstances, because He is the source of all fate and providence, and reality is affected by His Will, prayer, and the like.
FN:
- Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Scott Goins, Barbara Wyman (San Fransisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), Cf. 148.
- Ibid
Inexpressible Thee, whom I laud
Undeniable Thy complex simplicity,
