The Strengths and Limits of the Argument from Miracles
The argument from miracles is often presented as a proof for the existence of God. However, its strength and persuasiveness are largely dependent upon the interpretive framework of its audience. This essay will argue that while miracles can serve as powerful confirmations of belief, their value as arguments against atheism is significantly limited by the epistemological commitments of non-theists.
The epistemological restraint of atheists already disallows them to consider abstract or not immediately present evidence, which is the reason they are not theists. The effectiveness of miracle-based arguments is therefore derivative of the effectiveness of arguments from experience. Even if they were presented with a miracle before them, it is likely they would assert it is just a phenomenon that science does not yet have the capability to describe, predict, or affect—or that the laws of nature do not perfectly obtain at every moment and place. Sometimes even the greatest of miracles cannot convince their immediate observers.
A similar problem is described in the “Rich Man and Lazarus” story. A Rich Man, “who feasted sumptuously every day,” died, went to hell, and out of regret for his present state he wished to save his brothers (Luke 16:19–22, 28). He asked that someone come from the dead to “warn them so that they will not also come into this place of torment,” but Abraham replied, “If they do not listen to Moses and the prophets, neither will they be convinced even if someone rises from the dead” (Luke 16:27–31). Although this parable is meant to concern moral choices and their eternal consequences, it would seem convenience and inconvenience of evidence are still elements of the story. The formally rich man believes that if he had sufficient evidence given to him that this was going to happen, he would have believed and done right. However, the distinction between what is and is not sufficient evidence seems irrelevant, based on Abraham’s response.
Knowing Christ’s miracles, Pharisees and others, still refused to believe what Christ said about Himself (Matthew 12:22–37). Even if one is persuaded as an observer, their former peers would likely consider this shift in conclusion as due to insanity, hallucination, deception, or a breach of logic rather than an honest pursuit of truth, with different premises being acquired. Thus, even if I well present the "Miracle of the Sun" with the greatest scrutiny of investigation and verification, the evidence would be dealt an understandable, even if incorrect, genetic fallacy.[1]
The aforementioned personal favorite miracle, however, is the "Miracle of the Sun" during the Fatima apparition of Mary on October 13, 1917. It is reported that more than thirty thousand people witnessed the same miracle. As much as atmospheric distortions could be said to account for the spectacle, the fact that so many people were gathered and saw it, the precise “random” moment that it occurred, and the odd sequence of events is about as convincing as it gets. No explanation, however scientific, would be sufficient to explain the alignment of so many causes and effects.
In conclusion, the argument from miracles has both strengths and limits. It is strongest when supported by large-scale, public testimony, and when used as confirmation for those already inclined toward faith. However, as a direct argument against atheism, its persuasiveness is sharply restricted by the epistemological assumptions of non-believers, who are predisposed to reject supernatural explanations in favor of naturalistic ones.
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